Cartesian and Leibnizian Metaphysics was an analytical paper examining the foundational divide between monism and dualism in early modern philosophy. The project contrasted Descartes’ dualist model, where mind and body stand as two separate kinds of substance, with Leibniz’s monadic monism, in which reality is composed of simple, indivisible units coordinated through pre-established harmony.

The paper traced how each philosopher accounts for perception, consciousness, and the mind–body relationship. Leibniz’s vision of monads as internally driven “true atoms of nature” (and the metaphysical elegance of harmony without interaction) was set against Descartes’ commitment to the res cogitans and res extensa, where thinking and extension form fundamentally different realms. The project also challenged the tensions within each system: the problem of randomness for Leibniz’s monads, and the practical difficulties of Descartes’ claim that mind and body are ontologically different yet experientially intertwined.

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